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Summary 
Major policy initiatives such as the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) in the national contract 
for general practitioners might variably be informed by evidence at their inception, implementation and 
subsequent evolution. But what evidence gets admitted into these policy debates – and what is left 
out? Using QOF as an example, this article demonstrates what an analysis of the relationship 
between policy and the associated research can tell us about the underlying policy assumptions and 
about the role of evidence in policy debates. 
 
Introducing the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) 
The formation and implementation of policy are not especially linear, wholly rational, or always fully 
evidence-based (Weiss, 1977; Weiss, 1982). Understanding these dynamics, and teasing out the role 
of research evidence, has been a major preoccupation of researchers and policy analysts in recent 
years – with the hope that a better understanding of these processes can lead to better policy making 
and improved services. While policy typically changes only incrementally, sometimes circumstances 
conspire to prompt more radical shifts (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). One such radical shift 
occurred in the United Kingdom in 2004 with the incorporation of the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) into a new national contract for general practitioners (GPs), negotiated between 
the Department of Health (DH) and the British Medical Association (BMA) (Roland, 2004). The new 
contract aimed to increase GP rewards and improve the quality of patient care by linking substantial 
payments to practice performance on 146 publicly-reported quality indicators. 
 
Several factors aligned to create the necessary conditions for the introduction of quality-related 
financial incentives. First, pay for GPs had fallen behind that of specialists working in hospitals, and 
general practice was suffering from low morale and a recruitment and retention crisis (British Medical 
Association, 2001). Second, evidence had emerged that quality of care in many settings was highly 
variable (Institute of Medicine, 2001; Leatherman and Sutherland, 2003). Third, technical 
improvements now made it possible to measure quality of care more accurately, and several 
countries had begun experimenting with pay-for-performance systems derived from industry (Mannion 
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and Davies, 2008). Finally, the UK government had committed to improving quality and equity of care, 
supported by additional investment in the NHS. From this convergence of factors, a consensus 
emerged between the profession and the DH that a new GP contract was required that would 
incentivise doctors to work in general practice and improve access to high quality care (National Audit 
Office, 2008). The QOF was the centrepiece of these new arrangements (Shekelle 2003; Roland, 
2004). 
 
Since its inception there has been debate about how the QOF should be maintained and developed, 
and it is subject to annual review. Potential revisions are supported by a review of relevant evidence 
(more recently, by The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, NICE 2011), but the final 
decisions on changes to the framework result from contract negotiations between the DH and the 
BMA. This article, however, does not focus on the QOF per se. Instead, we see what an analysis of 
the relationship between the QOF and associated research can tell us about underlying policy 
assumptions and the role of evidence in shaping policy debates. 
 
Research and policy 
Various models have been proposed to explain policy developments. Models that emphasise the 
chaotic nature of policy making, such as the ‘garbage can’ model (Cohen et al., 1972), regard the 
attachment of solutions to problems as a largely arbitrary or chance process. More structured views of 
the policy world see change as being driven by interactions between distinct streams of activity and 
debate, such as the political and media swirl that highlights particular issues as problems, or the 
policy and research arenas that identify strategies and tools as potential solutions (Kingdon, 1984). 
When these streams come together, a major change may be possible – Kingdon identifies such 
moments as ‘policy windows’, an opportunity for new ideas to break through and command attention 
and action. Once such change has happened, a period of incremental modification and consolidation 
is then likely – as we have seen with the QOF since its implementation. Importantly, however, the 
particular circumstances that led to the original policy shift will continue to shape the sorts of 
incremental change possible thereafter (Pierson, 2000). 
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While by no means the overriding factor, research evidence can play a role at all stages, both shaping 
and constraining not just the initial policy shift, but also influencing subsequent developments. But 
why does some evidence come to the fore, whilst other evidence remains unconsidered? And what 
does this tell us about the interplay between research and policy?  
 
There are generally three types of stances adopted by researchers in influencing public policy: the 
consensual approach; the contentious approach; and the paradigm-challenging approach (Adapted 
from Rein, 1976; Weiss, 1995; Nutley et al. 2007).  The consensual approach refers to situations 
where there is broad agreement among policy makers and researchers about the main issues of 
concern and the ways in which these should be addressed. Researchers then work within the existing 
paradigm, aiming to provide policy makers, practitioners and other stakeholders with knowledge about 
how best to make technical adjustments to improve service delivery and outcomes.  In the 
contentious approach, researchers place themselves more on the sidelines of public policy. They may 
not always contribute to policy development directly, but maintain a more critical stance.  In the 
paradigm-challenging approach, researchers might take a stance outside the orthodoxy, working to 
problematize established ways of thinking. 
 
The research evidence that is most easily considered is that which works with the grain of current 
policy and preferred solutions, and that essentially offers technical refinements to the existing 
arrangements – the consensual approach. In that sense, research that offers little fundamental 
challenge is most easily assimilated into the discussion around policy.  More challenging research 
that calls into question the basic assumptions behind current policy directions is less likely to get a 
hearing. Taken-for-granted assumptions that underpin established policy directions are more resilient 
to challenge, often needing new policy leadership before they can be called into question. 
 
This paper then explores the array of research potentially relevant to the QOF. It examines what 
research evidence has been produced and is having some impact, what evidence has been produced 
but as yet is failing to influence, and what areas of potential interest and concern are relatively under-
explored. We draw upon deliberations from a series of workshops which explored the relationship 
between evidence and health policy. Workshop participants included primary care academics, with 
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briefing sessions delivered by policy experts and researchers. After selecting the QOF as a focus to 
explore the policy/evidence nexus, we drew on the results of structured reviews of the literature on 
pay-for-performance in healthcare conducted by workshop participants, as well as on other published 
review sources that focused specifically on QOF. From this account emerges an analysis of why 
certain patterns of research engagement are observed, and this analysis in turn highlights some 
implications for policy evolution and the potential role of research. 
 
The research discourse on the QOF so far 
While it might be tempting to talk of ‘bodies of evidence’ relating to a particular policy, it makes more 
sense to talk instead of a research ‘discourse’ – a way of conversing, and even thinking, about a topic 
that has clear limits as to what is seen as relevant and appropriate. Figure 1 provides an overview of 
the research discourse in relation to the QOF to date. It highlights, for example, the focus on 
quantitative analyses of QOF impact on incentivized care: in general; for specific conditions 
(particularly coronary heart disease and diabetes); and for underserved populations (mainly socio-
economically deprived populations but also minority ethnic groups and the elderly). This analysis has 
largely been consensus-building in nature, initially reinforcing the assumption that the QOF had 
improved care for incentivized conditions (e.g. Campbell et al., 2007; Doran et al., 2008). Over time, 
however, some have questioned the overall value of the QOF, often citing the same literature that had 
previously been used as evidence of its effectiveness (Gillam, 2010; Siriwardena, 2010). Research 
that is potentially more contentious, such as that showing that the QOF has had little impact on 
outcomes, disease management or hospital admissions (Purdy et al., 2011; Serumaga et al., 2011; 
Smith, 2011) has, until recently, generated little discussion or comment.  
 
Other areas of research have been conspicuous by their absence from discussions about the value of 
the QOF (Figure 1). For example, several predominantly qualitative studies have explored the impact 
of the QOF on practice nurses (Checkland et al., 2007; McDonald et al., 2007; McGregor et al., 2008)  
– yet there is little policy-related discussion of negative impacts on practice nurse workload or morale. 
Similarly, the research discourse on the patient experience has been relatively limited until recently 
(Hankins et al., 2007), with in-depth or longitudinal research only just starting to emerge (Dowrick et 
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al., 2009; Campbell et al., 2010; Coventry et al., 2011). Also neglected is an examination of whether 
the QOF has driven changes in the organization of care that especially affect patients with co-
morbidities – requiring them to attend multiple appointments for chronic disease management, which 
runs counter to calls for ‘minimally disruptive medicine’ (May et al., 2009).  Finally, there is little work 
exploring the types of governance and regulation that primary care organizations may be employing 
to monitor and influence practice performance through analysis of QOF data (O’Donnell et al., 2011). 
 
We would suggest that the lack of research discourse in some of these areas is due not only to 
shortages of data and technical difficulties. It is also a function of the inherently contentious nature of 
such work and its potential to challenge current thinking about the utility of the QOF. Thus while the 
QOF itself represented a major shift in physician reimbursement (Shekelle, 2003), we question what 
evidence is now required to reform or promote further radical shifts of the new orthodoxy. 
 
How can we explain the (im)balance of the research discourse? 
The patterning of what gets researched, and what does not – and what has influence, and what does 
not – is not arbitrary. There are deeper drivers, foremost of which is the original framing of the policy 
‘problem’ that the intervention was designed to address. 
 
The main aims of the QOF were to improve remuneration for GPs, thereby promoting recruitment and 
retention, and to incentivize high quality care (NHS Confederation and British Medical Association, 
2003). These aims were to be met by financially rewarding participation in an annual quality 
improvement cycle and the achievement of centrally-determined quality targets.  Subsequent re-
interpretations resulted in research that focused mostly on the technical aspects of the QOF as a pay-
for-performance scheme and its capacity to improve quality as defined under the framework. 
Subsequently, much of the discourse has treated GPs as agents whose behaviour needs to be 
monitored and controlled in order to prevent abuses of trust. Whilst this is a legitimate line to pursue, it 
tends to sideline other research on quality improvement that focuses on improving professionalism, 
wider aspects of the organization of care and the patient experience.  
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This dominant discourse may also fail to capture some of the less frequently voiced rational or 
benevolent reasons why GPs might game or circumvent the system: for example, GPs serving more 
socio-economically deprived populations may see exception coding in QOF as a legitimate means to 
correct what they see as inequitable resource distribution. Thus the original policy framing, and its 
subsequent co-option to newer policy discourses, has both enabled and constrained the parallel 
research discourse.  
 
Placing pay-for-performance centre-stage in this way also smuggles into the policy debate a set of 
assumptions that require rather more critical re-examination (Mannion and Davies, 2008). For 
example, pay-for-performance approaches assume that people act rationally in seeking to maximise 
income. Whilst this may be at least partly true, there is a risk that it fails to capture a wider range of 
determinants of behaviour. Hence, perceived peer pressure, reputational risk, a desire to conform and 
the need for approval may drive improvements in the delivery of care beyond upper payment 
thresholds for the QOF. There is also limited understanding of some of the finer-grained but 
nonetheless critical aspects of pay-for-performance – such as which organizational or team levels the 
scheme should operate at, and at what levels are incentives most cost-effective in achieving a desired 
change in clinical performance (Mannion and Davies, 2008).  
 
As so often with new policy, roll out occurred before evaluation. Thus, the context in which the QOF 
was negotiated precluded any prior testing of effects. Researchers, constrained by this, could 
subsequently only play “catch-up” by undertaking quasi-experimental evaluations, which are prone to 
bias, difficult to interpret and hence provide questionable evidence on effectiveness (Campbell et al., 
2007; Campbell et al., 2009; Serumaga et al., 2011). Research supply-side issues also provide some 
explanation for the patterning of the research discourse around the QOF. Earlier research on specific 
quantitative issues around impact was facilitated by core DH funding and drew upon readily available 
data generated by the payment system. In contrast, for example, qualitative research challenging 
some of the assumptions about the mechanisms and benefits of the QOF took longer to emerge, 
partly because of the time needed to acquire the necessary resources to establish studies and to 
collect and analyze the data.  
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The dominant research discourse on the QOF was therefore driven by assumptions about policy 
objectives and mechanisms, as well as by the context of its implementation. As a result the discourse 
largely reflects the joint agenda set by GPs and government, each committed to a major new 
initiative. Work reflecting the interests of other, less powerful, groups, such as primary care nurses 
and patients, has been relatively slower to emerge and has struggled to get onto the policy agenda. 
Even now, much of the debate about the future direction of QOF concerns which indicators should be 
retired or introduced (Anekwe, 2011; NICE, 2011), rather than the more contentious issues about its 
mechanisms, effects and wider consequences. 
 
Conclusions 
We have used the example of the QOF in this paper due to its currency and policy relevance. This 
discussion is about understanding the development of an evidence base and the subsequent 
discourse around it, and not about judging the quality or strength of that evidence. Our analysis 
contends that what evidence gets to the policy table reflects the interests and preconceptions of 
powerful stakeholder groups and the biases introduced by the differential availability of data. In 
Kingdon’s terms of ‘problem’, ‘policy’ and ‘political’ streams (Kingdon 1984), the ‘problem’ of needing 
better remuneration for GPs met with a ‘policy stream’ which favoured quantitatively measurable 
targets and financial incentives, and a ‘political’ sense of mistrust of GPs as autonomous self-
employed agents who needed to be controlled. 
 
The evidence base is inevitably incomplete and imperfect – it is therefore important to consider where 
gaps in discourse lie and what these tell us about the prevailing assumptions and beliefs that 
influence policy evolution. For the QOF, some of these gaps are extensive. In addition, there has only 
been a limited response to emerging evidence, with most activity focusing on revision or inclusion of 
new clinical conditions: so selectivity in the attention paid to even available evidence is also clear.  
 
The example of the QOF provides a timely reminder of the risk of an incomplete body of research 
informing the policy discourse (availability bias), and draws upon the different typographies of 
research evidence (consensual, contentious or paradigm-challenging) to illustrate how not all 
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research is seen as equally relevant and/or influential. In this case, monitoring the success of current 
indicators, or collating evidence for the insertion of new indicators, seems to be the research that is 
most readily taken into account. In contrast, research that undermines beliefs about the power of 
financial incentives, or focuses on the dysfunctional consequences of policy implementation, appears 
less welcome in debates around the QOF. 
 
There are lessons from this example for other policy developments, such as new commissioning 
arrangements in health care, changes to the benefits system and the prospects for criminal justice 
system reform. Above all, this analysis cautions against the legitimizing rhetoric of evidence: when 
policy advocates make claims that policies are informed by evidence we should ask not only which 
evidence has shaped the policies, but also what of the evidence that has not. 
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Figure 1. Research discourse in relation to the Quality and Outcomes Framework 
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